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Abstract This article develops the concept of ‘‘Functional Regulatory Space’’ (FRS) in
order to analyze the new forms of State action addressing (super) wicked problems. A FRS
simultaneously spans several policy sectors, institutional territories and levels of govern-
ment. It suggests integrating previous policy theories that focused on ‘‘boundary-spanning
regime,’’ ‘‘territorial institutionalism’’ or multi-level governance. The FRS concept is
envisaged as a Weberian ‘‘ideal-type’’ of State action and is applied to the empirical study
of two European cases of potential FRS: the integrated management of water basins and
the regulation of the European sky through functional airspace blocks. It will be concluded
that the current airspace regulation does match the ideal-type of FRS any better than the
water resource regulation does. The next research step consists in analyzing the genesis and
institutionalization of potential FRS addressing other (super) wicked problems such as
climate change and economic, security, health and immigration issues in different insti-
tutional contexts as well as at various levels of governance.
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Introduction: how does the State solve (super) wicked problems?
The myopic nature of policy theories focusing on a single policy subsystem or policy
sector, which constitutes one institutional territory and one level of government, is prob-
lematic for analyzing how the State currently addresses (super) wicked problems
(Rittel and Webber 1973; Levin et al. 2012), such as climate change, integrated water basin
management, technological risks and financial crises.1 Such public problems generally
involve a large population of people who have been negatively affected, a high degree of
intensity or severity of the problem’s consequences on individuals’ lives, a high level of
public visibility and politicization, a complex set of causes generating the problem, and last
but not least, (super) wicked problems tend to be politically constructed as new and urgent.
Levin et al. (2012: 127–128) even argue that four unique features of so-called super wicked
problems lead to collective tragedies. While ‘‘time is running out,’’ the absence of a central
authority, the lack of credible long-term commitments by policy-makers, and the fact that
‘‘those seeking to end the problem are also causing it’’ hinder efforts to overcome the
catastrophic impact of super wicked problems. To adequately tackle these problems,
Levin et al. propose a new epistemological approach and then formulate clear policy
prescriptions (2012: 138–147). In a nutshell, the design of policy solutions to super wicked
problems should capitalize on path-dependent processes and create sticky interventions
that gradually increase the coalition of supportive policy actors.
For this article, the State’s responses to public problems that are currently being per-
ceived politically as (super) wicked and are officially labeled as such (e.g., Australian
Government 2007) have also been analyzed. However, we have no prescriptive ambition at
this stage and suggest focusing further research on the processes of public action that cross
different policy subsystems, institutional territories and levels of government. The concept
of ‘‘Functional Regulatory Space’’ (FRS) will be developed to deepen our understanding of
these new forms of State action. Such an approach is a fruitful means of bringing together
the contributions of several scholars who have studied (the ongoing transformations of)
policy processes from various innovative perspectives: boundary-spanning regime
(Jochim and May 2010); new governance arrangements (Howlett and Rayner 2006); ter-
ritorial institutionalism (Carter and Smith 2008); multi-level governance (Hooghe and
Marks 2003); and super wicked problems (Levin et al. 2012). Integrating these approaches
allows for the simultaneous and combinatory analysis of three different dimensions, which,
in our opinion, increasingly characterize State interventionism when addressing (super)
wicked problems, most notably the coordination of various public policies, institutional
territories and levels of government.
As will be elucidated in this article, a boundary-, territory- and level-spanning State
action is best characterized as ‘‘Functional Regulatory Space’’ (FRS). In order to dem-
onstrate the innovative potential of this new ideal-type of State action, we will proceed as
follows. Section ‘‘Policy sector, institutional territory and level of government: a critical
literature review’’ critically reviews the existent literature, while Section ‘‘Functional
Regulatory Spaces (FRS): an Innovative Concept’’ introduces the concept of FRS. Section
‘‘Two examples of potential FRS’’ presents preliminary empirical evidence on the ana-
lytical relevance of FRS for understanding how the political ‘‘rescaling process’’ of State
action occurs in two domains: integrated water basin management and airspace regulation
1 We would like to thank Peter J. May, Bernard Debarbieux, Ge´raldine Pflieger and the three anonymous
reviewers for their fruitful comments on previous versions of this article.
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in Europe. The final section of the article identifies the next steps of a promising research
agenda on FRS.
Policy sector, institutional territory and level of government: a critical literature
review
During the first decades of scholarship on policymaking, the focus of analysis was on how
the State solved a concrete public problem within a specific sector, an institutional territory
and a single level of government, respectively, across different levels of government in a
federalist State. Certainly, this seminal approach has been strongly challenged by the
emergence of new kinds of (more complex) public problems, and subsequently, new State
actions conceived and implemented to reduce the impact of such problems cutting across
policy sectors, territories and levels of government. In reaction to these empirical devel-
opments, various models of policymaking have analytically addressed one of these three
dimensions (sector, territory and government level). In the following sections, first the core
arguments of these approaches will be summarized and then their limits to understand the
rearrangement of State action highlighted. Our central claim is that thus far, there has been
no theoretical concept that simultaneously considers inter-policy coordination, trans-
territorial regimes and multi-level governance. This leads us to propose, as an ideal-type, a
more integrated concept that we call ‘‘Functional Regulatory Space’’ (FRS).
‘‘Boundary-spanning regime’’: coordination between policy sectors
Many scholars have progressively pointed out that complex public problems span the
boundaries of several policy sectors. To understand the policy processes related to the
treatment of these messy problems, it is necessary to go beyond the logic of single policy
subsystems. In this subsection, the arguments for an approach that takes into account cross-
subsystem policy dynamics will be reviewed, relying mainly on the advocacy coalition
framework (ACF) (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). This approach seems quite obvious
as the concept of the policy subsystem is at the center of the ACF: When applying this
framework, the first step is to determine subsystem boundaries by documenting belief
systems and patterns of coordination among regular participants in policymaking.
By focusing on subsystems as a unit of analysis, the ACF tends to focus on the func-
tioning of a given policy subsystem and to underplay the potential influence of parallel
subsystems. In the original formulation of the theoretical framework, the existence of other
subsystems is implied, but the potential effects of trans-subsystem influences often remain
unexplored. For instance, the concept of the ‘‘nested subsystem’’ (Howlett 2009) insists
more on chains of relationships across decision levels rather than on pyramidal structures,
where decisions made at a higher level influence multiple groups of policymaking par-
ticipants at a lower level, which result in a ‘‘splitting’’ of the subsystem at these levels if the
lower-level groups make different—or even incompatible—policy choices.
Focusing on ‘‘trans-subsystem dynamics,’’ Jones and Jenkins-Smith (2009) also note
that ‘‘the treatment of trans-subsystem change […] within the Advocacy Coalition
Framework has been underspecified’’ (our emphasis). Furthermore, ‘‘the meso-level
(i.e., individual subsystem) analysis characteristic of ACF scholarship has militated against
the modeling of macrolevel interactions between subsystems that may influence both
subsystem and coalition composition and offer important insights into policy change more
generally’’ (Jones and Jenkins-Smith 2009, 37–38).
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The need for increased coordination between government and administrative structures
belonging to various policy subsystems has long been indicated by policy process and
governance scholars. According to this body of literature, the different forces at play within
the State machinery push in different directions. This leads to the development of various
ways of dealing with public problems with compartmentalized authorities defending their
own autonomy and with fragmented decision-making along policy sectors (Luhmann
2006). The concepts of ‘‘positive and negative coordination’’ (Scharpf 1994), ‘‘intra-policy
and inter-policy coordination’’ (Knoepfel 1995), ‘‘joined-up’’ government (Christensen and
Laegreid 2007; Ling 2002) or ‘‘substantive policy integration’’ (Briassoulis 2005) within a
‘‘New Governance Arrangement’’ (Howlett and Rayner 2006) typically focus on the way
this lack of coordination can be mitigated. The aim is to bridge organizational divides,
which are largely seen as structural. Consequently, a coordinated State action would
compensate for fragmented State structures.
From the perspective of policy process scholars, the coordination approach most fre-
quently utilized by governance scholars ignores the larger policy dynamics associated with
policy subsystems. Conversely, by focusing on policy subsystems as the basic unit of
analysis, policy process scholars underestimate the challenges posed by trans-subsystem
dynamics. Understanding these dynamics is central to addressing the governance of
‘‘messy’’ policy problems that span multiple policy arenas (Jochim and May 2010).
According to Jochim and May (2010), a new conceptual basis is necessary for
approaching messy problems. To that end, they introduce the concept of ‘‘boundary-
spanning policy regimes.’’ Their goal is to develop a concept that addresses trans-
subsystems policy dynamics that go beyond the coordination approach of governance
scholars. Jochim and May define a boundary-spanning policy regime as a ‘‘governing
arrangement that spans multiple subsystems and fosters integrative policies’’ (p. 307). In
order to exist, a boundary-spanning policy regime must be supported by political forces
that break the inertia of independent policy subsystems. The inertia of subsystems
undermines coherent policy; the extent to which the forces of inertia reorganize in favor of
a boundary-spanning regime determines the precise contour and strength of the regime
(p. 304). Policy regimes are shaped by the same variables as subsystems: issues, which call
for a political definition of a problem; ideas, which provide a common understanding of
policy purpose; interests, because policy actors’ support determines the governing capacity
of a regime; and institutions, which guarantee integration across elements of policy sub-
systems and stability (pp. 311–313).
In this article, the boundary-spanning policy regimes developed by Jochim and
May (2010) will be built on. In accordance with these authors, it will be argued that
understanding State responses to (super) wicked policy problems requires going beyond
mere inter-policy coordination. Larger policy dynamics associated with policy subsystems
must also be taken into account. However, an additional step is proposed in the devel-
opment of policy process theory that takes into account the fact that trans-subsystem
approaches too often ignore the impact of territorial boundaries and multi-level governance
in the policy process.
‘‘Territorial institutionalism’’: coordination between institutional territories
The complexity of policy processes is linked to the number of policy actors involved who
belong to different subsystems and are active at various levels of government. The odds are
that they will straddle different boundaries of institutional territories. We argue that this
dimension is central in the understanding of State responses to (super) wicked problems.
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Comparative analysts have long relied on differences between countries (or decentralized
entities in a federal system) to increase the statistical depth of their analyses, but policy
process scholars rarely take into account territorial boundaries. When they do, it is mostly
to study differences at the national level. For instance, Howlett and Rayner (2006) have
compared the convergence and divergence of ‘‘New Governance Arrangements’’ to
manage, with a higher level of policy integration, forests and fisheries in OECD countries.
Policy process scholars seem to disregard the territorial boundary variable in favor of
focusing mainly on subsystems boundaries.
However, some authors have insisted on the importance of territorialized approaches in
both political geography (e.g., Brenner 2004) and policy process theories. For instance,
Nohrstedt and Weible (2010) analyze the impact of geographical and policy proximities on
subsystem changes. Spatial conceptualization is also a prerequisite of the ‘‘polycentric
political system’’ developed by Ostrom et al. (1961). This approach focuses on the com-
plex networks of institutions crafted by communities. Only when individuals facing a
collective problem are unable to address that problem do they call for the intervention of
higher-level coercive governance structures. A number of cross-scale linkages have been
described and analyzed by resource management scholars: ‘‘nested enterprises’’ (Ostrom
1990), co-management arrangements (Berkes and Folke 1998) or ‘‘vertical interplay.’’
In their analysis of vertical interplay between different levels of social organizations,
resource management scholars have shown that interactions result in patterns of domi-
nance, separation, merging, negotiated agreement or system change (Young 2006). In
political geography, literature on ‘‘the political construction of scale’’ insists on the fact
that political actors actively seek to ‘‘construct’’ certain conceptions of scale in order to
promote their specific political objectives (Bulkeley 2005: 884; Delaney and Leitner 1997;
Jones 1998; Marston 2000).
While many policy scholars point out the necessity of an analysis that goes beyond
subsystem boundaries and that takes into account multi-level governance, the impact of
territorial boundaries on the policy process has received less attention. Carter and Smith
(2008) suggest, however, that the ‘‘usages of territory’’ by policy actors (Keating 1998) are
the key to understanding policymaking processes and outcomes. These authors tangibly
propose the revitalization of the policy analyses of the European Union (EU) or other
institutional schemes of multi-level governance (MLG) by adopting a territorial institu-
tionalist approach.
This analytical turn implies a shift from a functionalist perspective of MLG
(i.e., explanations based on the rational calculation of policy actors) to a more classical
Weberian approach to the State (i.e., territory as the basis for political representation and
legitimacy). Adopting this sociological perspective, Carter and Smith (2008: 267–270)
argue that the frontiers of an institutional territory are crucial for understanding the
legitimacy of policy actors. Furthermore, policy actors interpret their interests, define the
policy problem to be solved, and design the policy instruments to be implemented in
accordance with their economic, social and political position in a specific territory. The
boundary of a policy subsystem and the circle of eligible policy actors are thus influenced
by the preexisting institutional territory and its underlying institutional order: ‘‘(…) Ter-
ritory always matters in the government of a sector but it only causes policy outcomes
when territorial references are mobilized in a manner that engages with the sector’s
institutionalized logic of action’’ (Carter and Smith 2008: 268). The ‘‘political assignment
of authority’’ within a public policy thus derives from the interplay between the percep-
tions of a policy sector and an institutional territory. Here again, it is important to stress
that such an approach tends, in dealing with the question of (trans-)territorial coordination,
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to focus on single policy subsystems (see, for example, the cases of fishery and wine
analyzed by Carter and Smith 2008). Therefore, this approach tends to neglect the question
of inter-policy coordination.
‘‘Multi-level governance’’: coordination between levels of government
Most scholars in political science agree that public policies are increasingly formulated and
implemented in a multi-level context. Within the ‘‘multi-level governance (MLG)’’ liter-
ature (Enderlein et al. 2010), a distinction is made between multi-level polity (general-
purpose jurisdictions) and multi-level regime (overlapping functional jurisdictions), or
what Hooghe and Marks have called Type I and Type II jurisdictions (Hooghe and
Marks 2003).
Type I of MLG refers to multi-purpose or general jurisdictions (i.e., levels of govern-
ment in federalist countries). In federalist countries, the power of policymaking has tra-
ditionally been dispersed across multiple jurisdictions at various institutional levels
(e.g., between the Federal State, the 26 cantons and the myriad municipalities in
Switzerland). Beyond the classical situation of federalist countries, a similar fragmentation
of power is increasingly induced by the internationalization of public policies. For
example, European integration has clearly impacted domestic policies and politics, thereby
challenging the central level of Member States. Empirical studies have shown that the
Europeanization of public policies does not lead to a unilateral strengthening or weakening
of one level of government at the expense of the others (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002; Boerzel
and Risse 2003; Bulmer and Lequesne 2005; Graziano and Vink 2007). They do show,
however, that the Europeanization process results in new and more complex forms of
shared governance and networks of policy actors. Type I jurisdictions are general-purpose
organizations that operate on a clearly bounded (administrative) territory.
Type II of MLG is task-specific jurisdictions operating within or across administrative
territories of the multi-purpose jurisdictions, the perimeter of which are defined by the
functional (i.e., social and spatial) limits of the problem. Their purpose is to address a
single policy problem (e.g., public transport or urban services, ozone depletion or the water
quality of transboundary rivers) at a scale of intervention that is deemed appropriate. Thus,
‘‘Type II governance tends to be embedded in legal frameworks determined by Type I
jurisdictions’’ (Hooghe and Marks 2010: 23). Type II jurisdictions operate linkages
between levels of government (center-periphery) and between public and private actors
(State–society relationship). ‘‘Type II, for the moment still lacking a well-identified
‘real-life’ referent, looked like an anarchical, fluctuating superimposition of single-purpose
jurisdictions with overlapping memberships’’ (Piattoni 2009: 170). According to Hooghe
and Marks (2010), Type II jurisdictions are task-specific, with intersecting membership at
diverse scales (which means that smaller jurisdictions are not contained within larger ones)
and with a flexible design. They are supposed to respond flexibly to citizens’ changing
preferences, with a possibility of exit and substitutes. Type II jurisdictions tend to appear
when Type I jurisdictions are unable to address a given policy problem; when ‘‘the high
boundary integrity of Type I governmental systems produces a competency constraint, in
other words where mainstream governmental organizations are unable to respond flexibly
to policy issues that intersect their jurisdictions’’ (Skelcher 2005: 94). Type II jurisdictions
usually operate at the national–international frontier, as, for example, in the enactment of
transnational standards on fair labor or sustainable forestry (see Bartley 2011), in cross-
border regions (e.g., the INTERREG IV France-Wallonie-Vlaanderen Program that stim-
ulates economic and social cooperation between neighboring regions of France and
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Belgium), as well as at the local level (e.g., provision of urban services) (Hooghe and
Marks 2010: 24–25).
The Functional Overlapping and Competing Jurisdictions (FOCJ) approach developed
by Frey and Eichenberger (1999, 2001) is a good example of Type II at the local level.
Especially in the US and Swiss urban regions, task-specific (i.e., functional) jurisdictions
operate within a geographical perimeter which varies according to the types of urban
(collective) goods and (public) services delivered (e.g., water supply, sewage, gas, elec-
tricity, refuse collection, police, school, health services, public transport, etc.). The rele-
vance of such jurisdictions is mainly justified, on the one hand, by the fragmented spatial
distribution of the individual and collective preferences regarding the characteristics of the
goods and services delivered (i.e., quantity, quality and price) and, on the other, by the
technical specificities of the different (network) industries and the differences regarding
their relevant geographical perimeters for organizing economies of scale. The FOCJ
approach shows how territorially flexible task-specific jurisdictions often coexist with and
transcend institutional territories. In this way, it is quite similar to the concept of poly-
centric governance (Ostrom et al. 1961; McGinnis and Ostrom 2008; Aligica and Tarko
2012). However, it seems clear that the FOCJ approach tends to deal essentially with cases
of single-task jurisdictions, such as water supply, sewage, security and schools. In a nut-
shell, the FOCJ approach does not formulate an explicit theoretical proposition concerning
the crucial question of ‘‘inter-policy coordination’’ (Knoepfel 1995) or of ‘‘boundary-
spanning policy regime’’ (Jochim and May 2010), as discussed above.
Type II governance also addresses State–society relationships. Type II jurisdictions
involve interest groups in the decision-making process that are considered to be problem-
solvers. This involvement ranges from simple consultations of private actors to self-
regulation in which the public authorities only validate or apply the decisions taken by
‘‘private interest governments’’ (Streeck and Schmitter 1985). It is widely acknowledged in
the literature that Type II jurisdictions are very often steered by private actors, notably at
the international level (Khagram and Waddell 2007; Brenner 2004; Bartley 2011).
‘‘The constituencies of Type II jurisdictions are individuals who share some geo-
graphical or functional space and who have a common need for collective decision-
making—e.g., as irrigation farmers, public service users, parents, exporters, homeowners,
or software producers.’’ (Hooghe and Marks 2003: 240). This is in keeping with Ostrom
et al.’s effort to highlight the modes of (private) governance that escape both hierarchy and
the market and that occur in various forums: ‘‘These include families and clans, neigh-
borhood associations, communal organizations, trade associations, buyers and producers’
cooperatives, local voluntary associations and clubs, special districts, international regimes
(e.g., CPR, global commons, international environmental problems), public service
industries, arbitration and mediation associations, and charitable organizations’’ (Ostrom
and Walker 1997: 36). As such, the implicit assumption made in the MLG literature is that
Type II governance is driven by private actors or interest groups, or is at least designed to
strongly involve them in policymaking.
In this respect, research on global commons (Buck 1998: Khagram and Waddell 2007;
Orr 2006), on the scaling up of CPR regimes (McGinnis and Ostrom 2008; Stern 2011;
Young 1994, 2008) or on the interplay between local, national and international levels of
environmental and resource regimes (Young 2006) clearly highlights the central role
played by private actors in MLG arrangements dealing with CPR and environmental
issues. Moreover, coordination issues between levels of governance are addressed here in
multiple ways, such as the comparison of similarities and specificities of policy processes
at various (local, national, international) levels (Young 2008); the emergence of an
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international single issue policy subsystem or regime composed of networks of private and
public actors coming from various institutional levels (Khagram and Waddell 2007;
Orr 2006); or a systematic analysis of the applicability (i.e., extension) of the design
principles for long-enduring small-scale CPR institutions (Ostrom 1990) on a larger scale
(i.e., global commons) (McGinnis and Ostrom 2008; Stern 2011).
Thus, the question is no longer whether or to what extent multi-level governance (MLG)
is a reality, but how MLG should be organized in order to be accountable, democratic and
efficient in problem-solving (Hooghe and Marks 2003: 233). This issue is particularly
striking with Type II jurisdictions as these bodies ‘‘have properties that lead to weak
‘democratic anchorage’’’ (Skelcher 2005:96). In situations where private actors lead the
process, or in situations of co-regulation between public and private actors, accountability
relies on non-binding mechanisms based on expertise and reputation (i.e., peer-, public
reputational-, market-, financial- and legal accountability) (Brenner 2004). This differs
with jurisdictions led by public authorities, where accountability depends on the legal basis
of the arrangement and the legal obligations of each constituency. Governmental actors are
represented and the activities are mandated by national or supranational law, contrary to
the global networks (Black 2008: 138). The question that remains is: How do governments
remain accountable to citizens when they delegate public policy decision-making or
implementation to specialized agencies? This point is addressed in the literature on reg-
ulatory governance (Majone 1999; Coen and He´ritier 2005; Barbieri 2006; May 2007;
Gilardi 2008; Maggetti 2009), and examples are available in the research on comitology
(Christiansen and Larsson 2008; Brandsma 2010) as well.
Various solutions have been proposed to solve coordination problems that span different
levels of government (Jochim and May 2010: 308). Hooghe and Marks (2003: 239) have
suggested two different strategies: ‘‘One strategy is to limit the number of autonomous
actors who have to be coordinated by limiting the number of autonomous jurisdictions.
The second is to limit interaction among actors by splicing competencies into functionally
distinct units.’’ In other words, the first strategy consists in constraining the number of
multi-purpose or general jurisdictions (i.e., levels of government in federalist countries,
Type I of MLG). Furthermore, such jurisdictions must be defined in order to better
internalize all potential externalities. The second strategy implies constraining the inter-
action between multi-level task-specific jurisdictions (i.e., focusing on a particular policy
problem, Type II of MLG). This can be ensured if these single-purpose jurisdictions have
functionally distinct competencies in providing specific types of goods and services.
Finally, Type I and Type II MLGs are not sufficient for solving all coordination
problems according to Skelcher (2005: 94ff; 108). Collective agreements across jurisdic-
tions are still necessary for solving problems at the ‘‘system-wide level.’’ The main issue is,
in this respect, how to ensure ‘‘jurisdictional integrity’’ and how to design institutions that
can operate as sovereign entities exercising their own authority on a territory within both a
spatial and functional realm. The author convincingly demonstrates that the relationship
between multi-purpose jurisdictions and task-specific jurisdictions can be oppositional,
complementary or parallel. Therefore, design solutions should take into account the pos-
sibility of collaboration between these two types of MLG institutions. The challenge is then
to elaborate solutions that ‘‘are able to accommodate complexity of spatial patterning,
multiple functional overlays, partial polity forming and variable system coupling between
Type I and Type II entities.’’ (Skelcher 2005: 102).
Pointing out this (normative and theoretical) challenge, MLG scholars admit that there
is a need for a more accurate conceptualization of coordination issues between functional
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governance arrangements, institutional territories and levels of government. But our MLG
literature review also shows that there is a need for integrating the issue of policy sector
coordination (e.g., boundary-spanning regimes), which is clearly lacking in the MLG
approaches discussed above. For example, the FOCJ approach can account for the emer-
gence of trans-territorial regulatory arrangements, but by focusing on monosectoral
problems (i.e., single good or service provision), it does not take into account inter-policy
coordination issues. In the same way, CPR and environmental governance regimes scholars
also fail to address this factor when conceptualizing ‘‘cross-sectoral’’ issues as essentially a
problem of coordination between private, public, voluntary and community-like
(e.g., CPRI institutions) organizations, and not between actors involved in multiple policy
subsystems. In addition, no Type II MLG approach seriously takes into account the impact
of territorial boundaries on the policy process or the ‘‘usages of territory’’ by policy actors
(see section ‘‘‘Territorial institutionalism’: coordination between institutional territories’’
above).
Combining sectors, territories and level: political rescaling process
The conclusion of our brief literature review is that previous (competing) approaches have
stressed different and, at the same time, complementary dimensions of State action.
Table 1 gives an overview on the chiasmatic structure of current policy process theories. It
suggests that no part of the current framework simultaneously and explicitly takes into
account the cumulative problems of coordinating policy sectors, institutional territories and
levels of government.
Consequently, we have developed a new concept called ‘‘Functional Regulatory Space’’
(FRS), which combines all three dimensions. Such an integrated approach should allow for
a better grasp of the multi-dimensionality of contemporary State action. The next two
sections (‘‘Functional Regulatory Spaces (FRS): an Innovative Concept’’ and ‘‘Two
examples of potential FRS’’) will demonstrate how some new forms of contemporary State
action are best characterized by a global ‘‘political rescaling’’ process, simultaneously
implying new inter-policies dynamics, the redefinition of regulatory territorial perimeters,
and multi-level rearrangements. All three sub-processes are interdependent, even if they
can and should be distinguished analytically. These interdependencies have been, in our
opinion, only partially addressed by previous theoretical frameworks. The innovative value
Table 1 Multi-dimensionality of State action theories
Theoretical approach Coordination
between policy
sectors
Coordination
between
institutional
territories
Coordination
between levels
of government
Boundary-spanning regime
(e.g., Jochim and May 2010;
Howlett and Rayner 2006)
Core issue Issue addressed
implicitly
Issue addressed
implicitly
Territorial institutionalism
(e.g., Carter and Smith 2008)
Issue not addressed Core issue Issue addressed
implicitly
Multi-level governance and CPR
governance regimes (e.g., Hooghe
and Marks 2003; McGinnis and
Ostrom 2008; Young 2008)
Issue not addressed Issue addressed
implicitly
Core issue
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of the FRS concept is to specifically focus on these interdependencies to more fully
understand the entire political rescaling process.
Functional Regulatory Spaces (FRS): an innovative concept
First, a generic definition of an FRS will be presented and then the political rescaling
process inherent in the genesis and institutionalization of an FRS identified. Finally, our
epistemological stance will be presented, which takes a Weberian approach to conceptu-
alizing the FRS as an ideal-type of State action.
Generic definition of FRS
An FRS is a regulatory space, which politically emerges in order to tackle, support or solve
problems concerning several policy sectors in different institutional territories and at
different levels of government. Such problems include, for example, climate change,
integrated water basin governance, financial crises, ‘‘centrality loads’’ in urban areas, etc.
These public problems are generally constructed as (super) wicked by policy actors and are
given high priority on the political agenda.
Thus, an FRS is a ‘‘sociopolitical field’’2 within the boundaries of which the (super)
wicked problem is politically recognized by public and private stakeholders, who agree on
the necessity of specific State intervention in order to solve it. In essence, an FRS is defined
as a new regulatory space considered functionally appropriate—that is, geographically and
socially relevant and politically legitimate—for the arbitration of rivalries and conflicts
between the different groups of actors concerned.
FRSs are functional in the sense that they redefine the social and geographical spaces
that are considered politically relevant for managing such problems. This redefinition
process follows ad hoc criteria referring both to the physical area concerned in the problem
and to the web of relationships linking stakeholders, rather than the existing boundaries of
policy sectors, institutional territories or levels of government. In other words, FRSs are
alternative regulatory spaces within which it becomes possible to tackle new types of
problems that cut across various socioeconomic sectors as well as institutional territories
and government levels.
An FRS is thus a space of inextricable rivalries and conflicts, as well as a space of
political regulation of these rivalries. The more or less clearly territorialized boundaries of
this field of power are defined by the stakeholders who act independently from the
boundaries of the preexisting sector-specific policies and institutional territories.3 The
perimeter of an FRS thereby demarcates the space of formal and informal rules regulating a
specific problem or set of rivalries.
Insofar as (super) wicked problems are more likely to change in their nature, scope and
boundaries than sector-specific or territorially defined problems, frequent changes in the
internal rules and regulatory objectives of FRS as well as in their perimeters over time are
2 In this sense, an FRS could, to a certain extent, be compared to the concept of the ‘‘social field’’ developed
by Bourdieu (1991) or to ‘‘configuration’’ proposed by Norbert Elias (Elias 1978).
3 More precisely, there are various possible forms of geographical manifestation of an FRS: for example,
surface (areolar) versus network (reticular); diffuse versus clearly bounded, etc. The shape depends on the
stakeholders’ perception of the characteristics of the problem addressed. Some problems are characterised
by quite clear geographical boundaries (e.g., integrated water basin management), while others are much
more diffuse (e.g., food safety, technological risks).
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observed. FRS must be understood as flexible and ad hoc regulatory regimes that emerge
after the political recognition of new types of public problems.
Due to the (super) wicked nature of the public problem addressed (i.e., large audience,
severity of consequences, complexity of causes, political visibility, newness and urgency),
the emergence of an FRS requires various kinds of reorganization processes between
different policy sectors, institutional territories and/or levels of government. Because of the
extensive interdependencies between inter-policy, multi-territorial and multi-level gover-
nance—and the resulting resistance to change—it is suggested that the emergence of FRS
goes together with ‘‘political rescaling’’ processes. Below it will be briefly discussed how
an FRS implies (1) a redefinition of the hierarchical relationships between policy sectors,
(2) new geographical perimeters of the political regulation and (3) a redistribution of
competencies between levels of government.
First, the emergence of an FRS implies a change in the definition of the public problem
to be solved through State action, as well as the priorities of State intervention. It thereby
implies a redefinition of inter-policy coordination and of the hierarchy between the existing
policy sectors (or policy subsystems) concerned about the specific problem addressed by
the actors of the FRS. In fact, because (super) wicked problems do not correspond to the
logic of existing policy sectors, their treatment requires the reorganization of the hierarchy
of policy objectives or even the redefinition of their respective scopes. Such a political
redefinition of policy objectives often results in the choice of new policy instruments and
implementation arrangements. Thus, an FRS corresponds to a change in State action that is
considerably more important than what can be expected by MLG coordination or the
emergence of FOCJ. The emergence of an FRS does not only imply the territorial or
functional redefinition of State action in one and the same policy sector. On the contrary, it
goes together with a new articulation between—and often a simultaneous redefinition of—
the policy designs of the different policy sectors concerned by the problem.
Second, the emergence of an FRS implies a redefinition of the spatial boundaries of
political regulation. (Super) wicked problems are characterized by the fact that their
geographical boundaries do not correspond to existing institutional territories. Because of
their functional nature, these kinds of problems go beyond the existing political territories
and are, in fact, mostly trans-territorial (e.g., international water basins, workers com-
muting across national borders, the spread of bird flu or other diseases across countries).
This gap between functional and institutional territories implies the definition of new ad
hoc spaces responding more efficiently to the emerging need for political regulation of the
problem. Thus, the relevant perimeter of an FRS demarcates the socio-geographical space
corresponding to the (super) wicked problem and does not necessarily correspond to
existing institutional territories. This is well illustrated in the management of such issues as
unemployment, mobility, criminality and fiscal competition that span municipal, regional
or national boundaries. Other well-documented examples concern the conflicts linked to
noise pollution around airports located at regional borders (e.g., conflicts between
Wallonia, Flanders and Brussels around Brussels International Airport) or international
borders (e.g., conflicts between Switzerland and Germany around Zurich Airport).
Third, the emergence of an FRS simultaneously implies a redefinition of the tasks and
competencies between levels of government. Insofar as (super) wicked problems do not fit
the existing institutional territories, they often cannot be addressed by a single level of
government, which is why they commonly involve transfers of power between different
levels of government and operate as catalysts for new dynamics of MLG. Such redistri-
butions of tasks and resources can take place from lower government levels to higher
levels (i.e., Europeanization or centralization), or vice versa (i.e., federalization or
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decentralization). They can also lead to the creation of new levels of governance
responsible for tackling the (super) wicked problem as shown, for example, by a number of
metropolitan governance scholars. Indeed, whatever their theoretical premises, political
rescaling authors (e.g., Brenner 2004), neo-regionalists (e.g., Norris 2001; Frisken and
Norris 2001) and urban political scientists (e.g., Le Gale`s 2002) have analyzed the ways in
which new levels of power were (re)emerging and (to some extent) institutionalized in
most European urban areas in the last two decades. Comparable developments of metro-
politan areas have a long tradition in North America (Ostrom et al. 1961), with such
examples as Portland’s Metro Council in Oregon or ‘‘Metro Vancouver’’ (Greater
Vancouver Regional District) in British Columbia. They have also shown how the creation
of these new urban governance structures was linked to the management of complex,
intersectoral and trans-territorial problems such as urban sprawl, centrality loads, transport
and mobility, economic competitiveness, and environmental and industrial risks.
Each of the three aforementioned processes contributes in a different way to a political
rescaling process that implies a specific kind of redefinition of the substantive (i.e., scope
of the problem definition), institutional (i.e., distribution of policy competencies across
levels of government) or geographical (i.e., spatial perimeter) scales of State action. The
most important added value of the FRS concept is its emphasis on the fact that the
emergence of an FRS does not boil down to the mere addition of these three rescaling
processes; the FRS concept highlights the extreme interdependency of these processes of
change in State action scales. For instance, changes in policy hierarchies (e.g., structural
measures implemented to reduce public debts in southern European countries and stabilize
the Euro) often depend on and imply a simultaneous redefinition of territorial and insti-
tutional scales (i.e., shifts of political power from the national State to the European level).
Section ‘‘Two examples of potential FRS’’ will go into this more thoroughly using the two
empirical examples of integrated water basin management and airspace block management
in Europe.
FRS as a Weberian ideal-type of State action
The FRS concept presented above is defined and used following the Weberian ‘‘ideal
typical’’ approach (Weber 1997). According to Max Weber, ‘‘an ideal-type is formed by
the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great
many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual
phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints
into a unified analytical construct (‘Gedankenbild’). In its conceptual purity, this mental
construct cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia. Historical
research faces the task of determining, in each individual case, the extent to which this
ideal-construct approximates to or diverges from reality’’ (Weber 1997 (1903–1917): 90).
Thus, in an ideal–typical perspective, the conceptual challenge relies on identifying and
caricaturing the significant and relevant (system of) features of the social phenomenon
being studied. The methodological procedure consists, then, of confronting and measuring
the divergence or, on the contrary, the congruence between the ideal-type or Gedankenbild
(i.e., FRS as rescaling process) and the empirical cases studied. Such an epistemological
stance means that the degree to which a specific empirical regulatory process corre-
sponds—or does not correspond—to an (ideal–typical) FRS situation as depicted in the
previous section has to be assessed. This methodological process will be applied in Section
‘‘Comparative analysis’’ (and noted in Table 2) by comparing two empirical cases
(i.e., integrated water management and functional air blocks) with the FRS ideal-type.
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Moreover, the comparison and identification of convergence or divergence between the
empirical reality and the conceptual construct should stimulate the formulation of
explanatory hypotheses concerning specific causal relationships between variables
(Bourdieu et al. 1991). By doing so, it should help to deepen and strengthen the com-
prehension of the specificities and similarities of the various empirical phenomena under
observation (i.e., the emergence of FRS and political rescaling processes in our case).
Table 2 Challenges of rescaling process within two potential FRS
Convergence/divergence
between empirical political
rescaling process and ideal–
typical FRS concept
Integrated water management (in
transboundary river catchments—
TRC)
Airspace regulation (in functional
airspace blocks—FAB)
(Super) wicked problems put on
the political agenda?
Yes Water pollution, agriculture,
floods, tourism, hydroelectricity,
ecosystem conservation, etc.
(i.e., rivalries between users of
the water resource)
Yes Dramatic increase of air traffic
(passengers and freight; civil
and military), airspace and
airport congestion, delays,
airprox, CO2 emission, noise
pollution, etc. (i.e., rivalries
between users of airspace)
New hierarchies between policy
sectors?
Partial Water considered to be a
resource and not managed
anymore within different policy
sectors in isolation
Increase in coordination and new
hierarchy between agriculture,
transport, health, energy,
tourism, etc., policies
Ongoing complex process due to
the high number and diversity of
involved policy subsystems
Yes Liberalization of the European
sky and environmental issues
imply a redistribution of
airspace use rights through a
new hierarchy of policy
objectives
Key issues addressed: military
airspace opened to civil aviation;
internalization of climate
change; and noise pollution
management
New geographical boundaries
beyond institutional territories?
Partial Regional, national and
international cooperation on
transboundary rivers
Geographical definition of water
basins remains to a certain
extent a political compromise
Resistance of existing institutional
territories: implementation
remains the competence of
national/regional governments
Yes FABs have cross-border
perimeters corresponding to the
functional needs of traffic flow
regulation (integration of ATM)
Coordination between national
governments at the FAB Council
New divisions of competencies
between levels of government?
Partial Supranational
management by the EU
Commission (‘‘Common
implementation strategy’’)
Coordination through
centralization within the
Member States (e.g., Wallonia
or France)
No imposition of new specialized
management agencies and no
single model of TRC agency
Partial Principle of a
supranational management of
airspace established and transfer
of some competencies to upper
levels of government (FAB
Councils, Eurocontrol and EU
Commission)
Eurocontrol as a specialized
agency
European Commission as
coordinator of the reform
No single air traffic controller for
each FAB (maintenance of
national air traffic control
agencies)
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Two examples of potential FRS
Functional Regulatory Spaces have spread in a variety of areas in the last few years
(Nahrath and Varone 2007). If the emergence and gradual consolidation of FRS constitute
pragmatic answers to (super) wicked problems that cross policy sectors, territories and
levels of government, FRS is nonetheless the outcome of fierce power struggles between
public and private actors involved in different policy subsystems (Swyngedouw 2004). In
this section, two examples of such emerging FRS in Europe will be introduced: trans-
boundary river catchments (TRC) and functional airspace blocks (FAB). After a short
description of each potential FRS, their conditions of emergence are presented, as well as
the issues that their reconfiguration raise in terms of policy sector (1), territoriality (2) and
levels of government (3).
Transboundary river catchments (TRC)
The European Union (EU) decided in 2000 to organize the integrated management of water
along river catchments. The Water Framework Directive (WFD) aims at reaching a good
status for water by 2015. This includes surface water (rivers), groundwater and tidal water
(estuaries), from both qualitative and quantitative perspectives. Adopting a resource per-
spective (i.e., a cross-sectors approach by definition), water management is organized in
river catchments, which are the territories around a river where rainfall ends up in the
river’s estuary. For major rivers, a river basin can reach thousands of square kilometers and
cross several countries (e.g., the Rhine, Meuse and Danube). River basins have already
been designated by the 27 Member States, at least within their own national borders, and
they have possibly coordinated themselves for international catchments. The Member
States are also obliged to set up management plans for each catchment, including a
diagnosis of the situation (i.e., all water uses) and a list of measures to improving the
sustainability of the water resource.
The model of river catchment that was already present in several Member States gave
inspiration to the EU decision-makers. In France, water management is partially organized
by the Agences de l’Eau which collect taxes on wastewater discharge and invest the funds
raised in treatment and water protection. In the United Kingdom and Germany, some
initiatives were also taken in this direction, but most pressure came from the scientific
community which favored the functional management of water. The EU proposal of a new
FRS for the integrated management of water resources is also built upon past experiences;
the international commissions of the Rhine, Meuse and Danube, for instance, were initially
designed to manage transboundary river catchments (TRC). The emergence of the TRC
scheme for an integrated water management system implies the three components of the
political rescaling process, as identified above.
(1) The new water management strategy is built on the functional space of the river
catchment. While it belonged initially to the policy sector of environmental
protection, it has been extensively broadened. Currently, it has direct implications on
various policy subsystems, such as public health (e.g., swimming areas and the quality
of drinking water), land-use (e.g., flood protection and flood zones), agriculture (e.g.,
fertilization and irrigation), industry (e.g., emission control), transport (e.g., inland
navigation), energy (e.g., water dams and minimum flow) and the environment (e.g.,
biodiversity and conservation). The parallel treatment of different concerns is
accompanied and legitimized by the creation of a dedicated territory encompassing
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the natural resource with the aim of sharing it between the different stakeholders
(i.e., all potential resource users).
(2) In terms of territory, the concept of a river basin, or water catchment, is mainly
functional and tends to stick to the hydrological perspective of a catchment, even if it
is sometimes difficult to delineate the exact boundaries of a river basin. When only
surface water is concerned and the river flows through hilly landscapes, it is quite
straightforward. But once combined with groundwater, the mapping exercise
becomes more difficult, as groundwater does not flow in the same direction as
rivers. Moreover, the boundaries of the water basins are sometimes fuzzy in flat land
where the water of different rivers mix (e.g., the Rhine, Scheldt and Meuse in the
Zeeland region of The Netherlands), or in the case of major hydraulic works (e.g.,
water transfers in the Ebro valley in Spain).
The political construction of the river basins also provides an answer for purely
political problems. In fact, the institutional territories resist this reconfiguration of
space, partly because they still own the administrative resources for running the
implementation process. In the EU, each Member State has claimed river basins
within their national borders, but has not directly considered their international
dimensions. In Belgium, for example, the river basins are intersected by the lin-
guistic border (e.g., a Walloon and a Flemish river basin) along the same river
Dender. Its regulation remains under the jurisdiction of the national or regional
governments and has not been delegated to water agencies, except in some
countries where the arrangements were previously set (e.g., France with the
Agences de l’Eau). In short, if a river basin is generally drawn according to
functional criteria and boundaries, it also remains to some extent a political
compromise.
(3) In terms of the distribution of competence between levels of government, TRC
management is not straightforward. The implementation process is distributed
between functional agencies and public authorities. Although the European WFD is
encouraging a functional organization of water management, it has not instituted
national or community water agencies. Implementation relies partly on the former
competence of national and regional government and partly on transboundary,
national or regional water agencies (e.g., the International Commission for the
Protection of the Rhine or the Agences de l’Eau in France), to whom competencies
are delegated by governments. On the one hand, the international commissions of the
Rhine, Meuse and Scheldt extended their competencies from the protection of the
river to the protection of the whole catchment. These authorities centralize
information and coordinate voluntary actions. On the other hand, national and
regional governments remain legally responsible for water management. New
authorities or specialized agencies are not created in an institutional void and must
thus cope with existing arrangements.
To sum up, with the implementation of the European WFD and its underlying TRC
scheme, an FRS was conceived without imposing new specialized management agencies.
The institutional territories and their authorities succeeded in maintaining their logic and
sometimes increased their power. At the supranational level, cooperation consists in
exchanging the best practices and adopting common standards in the context of the
‘‘common implementation strategy’’ of the EU Commission. The international river
commissions are compiling information on transboundary rivers and institutionalized
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dialogue between the national water authorities. Even if the unit of analysis changes, the
prevailing arrangements mainly remain at the national level, with an occasional recen-
tralization process. Change toward the development of a mature FRS is thus expected to be
incremental.
Functional airspace blocks (FAB)
The liberalization of the European sky and the continuous growth of aviation traffic have
prompted an increase in the rivalries surrounding the use of airspace and ground infra-
structure. Different types of traffic (transit flights, landing and departing flights) and different
kinds of operators (commercial airlines, business jets, leisure aviation, air force planes, etc.)
have to coexist in a limited airspace. In the last 10 years and despite the 9–11 terrorist attacks,
traffic has grown in Europe (e.g., by 40 % in Switzerland), resulting in increasing rivalries
and safety concerns (e.g., cases of airprox or near-collision) (Office fe´de´ral de la statistique
2010). In this context, the EU adopted the Single European Sky (SES) legislative package in
March 2004, comprising four regulations. This package is aimed at preventing its airspace
from becoming oversaturated by, for example, decreasing delays and congestion. Two
factors are identified at the source of the problem: air traffic increase and the division of
airspace between civil and military use. The objective of the SES is to improve the capacity
of airspace, notably by reorganizing air traffic management (ATM), irrespective of national
borders in FAB. These new FABs are designed not with regard to national territories, but
according to traffic needs and main commercial routes. Military forces are invited to inte-
grate the FAB and renounce the exclusive use of portions of airspace.
According to EU Regulation 551/2004, the creation of the FAB should result from a
progressive integration of the national ATM based on mutual agreements between the
Member States responsible for parts of airspace within each block. By the end of 2012, the
Member States must organize to set up operational FAB. They must also develop a flexible
use of airspace within the FAB, which implies closer coordination between civil and
military regulatory bodies. For instance, the six parties of FAB Central Europe (FABEC),
which includes France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg and
Switzerland, signed the FABEC Agreement in December 2010, detailing the conditions of
implementation of FABEC. The governance structure of FABEC remains purely inter-
governmental, with a FABEC Council comprised of civilian and military representatives
from each country. The question of rationalizing the national air traffic control agencies is
not directly addressed. Gradual integration through interoperability and common processes
is privileged by a radical redistribution of competencies (e.g., introducing competition for
the market between the different ATM).
Former initiatives on the functional organization of airspace existed before the creation
of the FAB. The first attempt was linked to the launch of Eurocontrol in 1963. The initial
objective of the convention signed by France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, Germany and Luxembourg was to make the supranational organization fully
responsible for the upper airspace of the entire area (above 24,500 feet or 7,500 m). Over
the years, the commitment decreased and some Member States reclaimed individual
responsibility for air traffic control. Nowadays, the political role of Eurocontrol has been
taken over by the EU Commission, and in the new arrangement, the organization’s main
tasks are confined to flight planning and the collection of route charges. Cross-border
airspace management has also developed for functional reasons, as in Switzerland, where
the airports are located close to national borders (e.g., Geneva Airport near the French
border and Zurich Airport near the German border). The Swiss air traffic control agency,
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Skyguide, has a competence on its delegated foreign airspace, that is, portions of airspace
located outside Swiss borders. It accounts for about 45 % of the total flights managed by
Skyguide. This situation is a result of bilateral international agreements.
As of 2001, the functional divide between civil and military airspace was called into
question. The two formerly separated airspaces are now integrated and managed by
Skyguide. This single agency dynamically adapts to the users’ needs (commercial traffic
and air force training) according to the respective traffic loads in the two airspaces. As
such, the constitutive elements of the FAB have not emerged from scratch. They existed
before in isolated solutions brought about by local problems before being systemized in an
FRS characterized by the political rescaling process identified above.
(1) At first sight, the FAB may appear to be single-sector regulatory arrangements.
However, they are in fact cross-sector FRS, as they link three formerly autonomous
policy subsystems: national defense; air transport; and environmental protection. With
the FAB, the supremacy of commercial aviation over airspace is clearly confirmed.
Most military zones are open to civil flight routes in a regulation known as the
‘‘flexible use of airspace.’’ Commercial flights are no longer obliged to avoid these
areas and are now allowed to fly over them. This new hierarchy between civil and
military aviation is the result of increasing pressure from the commercial sector,
which faces the saturation of civil airspace at peak hours. Furthermore, the FABs also
have environmental objectives. A more rational and better organized use of the routes
would lead to less fuel consumption, and thus, CO2 emission cuts. Since the protocol
to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto Protocol) adopted in
1997, the civil aviation sector has succeeded in internalizing environmental concerns
rather than being subject to the regulation of environmental agencies (for a similar
situation in the agricultural sector, with the implementation of agro-environmental
measures, see Montpetit 2002). The FAB must be perceived more as spaces where
heterogeneous users share a scarce common resource (the carrying capacity of the
airspace).
(2) The FABs have cross-border perimeters that encompass several portions of countries.
For example, the FAB Central Europe (FABEC) manages the airspace of five EU
Member States and Switzerland. They are designed according to purely functional
needs based on the operational requirements of traffic flow and largely ignore
institutional territories. This represents a paradigmatic change, as the Convention of
Chicago of 1944 established the principle of national sovereignty on national airspace
(art. 1). The boundaries of national airspace are land borders. The FABs do not repeal
this principle, but cope with it. They address the issue in terms of management in
times of peace and keep the arrangement reversible in case of conflict or military
threat. However, the emergence of this FRS creates tension with existing institutional
boundaries, which necessitates some trade-offs. For instance, the FABEC is not
strictly functional, but respects the national borders of its member countries. This is
clearly explained by the fact that in each country, the entire territory is managed by a
single air traffic control agency, which decreases transaction costs (imagine a
situation where the German Deutsche Flugsicherung would have to split up or
coordinate with partners in three of four different FABs). This arrangement is not
limited to the European Union, but encompasses associated countries in Europe
(i.e., Switzerland and Norway) and Africa (i.e., Tunisia and Egypt).
(3) Regarding multi-level governance, no public authority has the ability to supervise the
FAB. There are many candidates, but the future is still unclear. Eurocontrol seems to
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be increasingly in a position of becoming a specialized advising agency (comparable
to the European Environment Agency) rather than a regulator or a political arena. At
the same time, the EU Commission does not have enough authority to arbitrate the
reorganization of European airspace. As such, national governments maintain their
say on the process through weak coordination mechanisms. FABEC is run by a
FABEC Council comprised of civil and military representatives from the different
member countries. It is difficult for any party to renounce national competence on
aviation control. At the same time, the sovereignty of the European sky is not
transferred to the EU and remains national. National governments are put in the
difficult position of remaining liable for their national airspace while transferring its
management to supranational agencies. In the future, this cross-border airspace
regime may also provoke the entry of sub-national governments for their manage-
ment, notably those in charge of the management of major airports (e.g., the German
area of Hesse, hosting the Airport of Frankfurt or the Flemish Region in Belgium
hosting Brussels International Airport).
The main difficulties for this territorial integration are social. Air traffic controllers
are organized at the national level through powerful trade unions with strong bar-
gaining positions. They oppose the reform process out of fear of losing their social
advantages. Numerous strikes occurred in 2010 in France and Spain, to name but a
few. The unions fear personnel cuts, privatization of air traffic control agencies and
the introduction of competition (from the market). The current FABEC treaty
remains quiet about the form of integration of ATM within the area. Either the
question is too politically sensitive and governments fear strikes blocking the traffic,
or they expect a gradual integration through mutual cooperation between national air
traffic control agencies.
In summary, the FABs have well-delineated perimeters that have reached consensus
among the EU Member States and associated parties. The idea of a supranational man-
agement of airspace is established, in contrast to the regulation of transboundary river
catchments. Here, the difficulty is to transfer authority at the supranational level and
rationalize the management of the emerging FRS. It seems obvious that a single agency
should control air traffic, at least for upper airspace. However, the decision is highly
sensitive, and national governments prefer a gradual integration of air traffic controllers in
order to avoid social protests.
Comparative analysis
The differences observed between the two empirical cases (TRC and FAB) and the
comparison between these cases and the FRS ideal-type demonstrate the relevance of
simultaneously considering the three dimensions contributing to a political rescaling
process (cf. Table 2). Each case of potential FRS integrates different policy subsystems
around its functional issue and creates institutions for managing it. At the same time, the
existing institutional territories remain on the scene and participate actively in both the
initial design of the FRS and its implementation. Finally, the emergence of these two
potential FRS implies a shift in competencies between different levels of authorities, even
if these changes remain incremental. The actual delegation of the FRS management to a
specialized agency is, however, the exception rather than the rule.
As explained in section ‘‘FRS as a Weberian ideal-type of state action,’’ the FRS concept is
conceived to be an ‘‘ideal-type’’ of State action, which is useful for identifying the
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convergence and divergence between empirical reality and a theoretical construct.
Applying this epistemological approach, the extent to which integrated water management
and the regulation of civil aviation in Europe correspond, more or less, to the ideal-type of an
FRS as defined in Section ‘‘Generic definition of FRS’’ has thus been assessed. In so doing, it
can be concluded that the Functional Airspace Blocks (FAB) currently under development
match better with the ideal-type of an FRS than the emergence of basin authorities managing
transboundary river catchments (TRC), as represented in Fig. 1. The redefinition of the
hierarchies between various policy sectors is addressed in both empirical cases. However, the
process is less developed in the TRC case, due to the high number of policies to be reorga-
nized. Furthermore, the definition of a geographical perimeter and the redistribution of
competencies between levels of government as well are also more complex and incomplete in
the case of integrated water management than in that of airspace regulation. Thus, the
comparison between the FRS ideal-type and the two empirical examples shows the relevance
of the FRS concept as well as the hypothesis on the three-dimensional (i.e., intersectoral,
trans-territorial and multi-level) political rescaling process of State action, which aims at
solving (super) wicked problems. It also allows for the identification in both empirical
examples of their respective discrepancies with the ideal–typical FRS concept.
Figure 1 summarizes, from a three-dimensional perspective, the similarities and differ-
ences between the FRS ideal-type and the two empirical cases of potential FRS studied here.
The FRS ideal-type is indicated by a black dot at the extreme tip of each axis of Fig. 1. This
suggests that the FRS ideal-type always has many policy subsystems, levels of government
and institutional territories (see section ‘‘Generic definition of FRS’’ above). Such a graphical
representation demonstrates how European FAB better matches the FRS ideal-type than does
the TRC-integrated water management case. It allows identifying where (i.e., on which axes)
the most significant resistance lies to a more accomplished FRS.
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Fig. 1 Three-dimensional comparison between an FRS ideal-type and the two potential FRS
Policy Sci (2013) 46:311–333 329
123
Further research steps
This article has focused on the political rescaling process that characterizes current State
action and may be observed in various domains (e.g., integrated water resource manage-
ment and airspace regulation in Europe). Our main analytical claim was to simultaneously
consider three types of change that have thus far been addressed separately by scholarship
on policymaking, namely the redefinition of relationships between policy sectors, the
redefinition of the geographical perimeters of regulation, and the redefinition of compe-
tencies and responsibilities between different levels of government. To that end, the
concept of ‘‘Functional Regulatory Space’’ (FRS) has been developed, as this new ideal-
type of State action allows for the integration of previous approaches (i.e., boundary-
spanning regime, multi-level governance and territorial institutionalism) and thus proposes
a cumulative theory development. In so doing, the FRS concept should better reflect the
multi-dimensionality of State action to address (super) wicked problems, or the ‘‘poly-
centricity of governance’’ according to the IAD framework proposed by Ostrom and
colleagues (McGinnis 2011:171–172). In a nutshell, it has been argued that the major
theoretical and empirical challenge is to better grasp the interdependencies between inter-
policy coordination, the trans-territoriality of State action and multi-level governance. In
conclusion, three further research steps that would be beneficial for further study will be
suggested.
First, the dependent variables to be explained must be more precisely defined, that is,
the constitutive elements or building blocks of an FRS that can be measured empirically.
The variables already identified by previous approaches (i.e., issues at stake, ideas and
frames of reference, social identities, interest of stakeholders, institutional rules, assign-
ment of authority, geographical perimeters, time perspective, etc.) should be discussed,
selected and organized with the aim of assessing all FRS dimensions, while, at the same
time, remaining relatively parsimonious. In other words, the main features of the ideal-type
presented here need to be further developed. Furthermore, the impact of an FRS on the
collective problem to be solved should be assessed according to explicit evaluation criteria
in order to estimate the durability (over time) of a given FRS as well as its legitimacy.
Second, extensive theoretical work is still required to conceptualize the dynamics of the
political rescaling process underlying the development of an FRS. Different causal
mechanisms or ‘‘configurational paths’’ must be identified leading to the emergence,
institutionalization or even collapse of an FRS. This implies a deeper analysis of the
drivers of change and, furthermore, the causal interaction between factors simultaneously
inducing inter-policy, trans-territorial and multi-level transformations. The main research
questions, therefore, are as follows: Should a clear sequential development of the three
sub-processes be postulated? Would this mean, for instance, that successful multi-level
governance facilitates a new hierarchy between policy objectives in a second step? Or
should simultaneous and self-reinforcing effects of the three sub-processes be expected
instead (e.g., new actors and an ideational uptake, transgressing, at the same time, the
boundaries of policy sectors, government levels and institutional territories)? Or, on the
contrary, could negative feedback from a transformation failure to the other two processes
be observed? For example, institutional territories might hinder any further inter-policy
coordination or new multi-level arrangement. Elaborating a typology of the FRS dynamics,
or a historical path, is a key step toward theory development. The most recent work of
Levin et al. (2012) on the strategy to overcome the tragedy of super wicked problems is
highly relevant in this respect. The authors argue that path-dependent processes are
required for solving this kind of public problem and, in so doing, to develop and
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institutionalize what we have called an FRS. Furthermore, Levin et al. (2012:148) argue
that a ‘‘progressive incremental trajectory’’ is the best means toward that end. It would thus
make sense to systematically test this hypothesis to explain the success or failure of an
FRS.
Finally, additional empirical examples of potential FRS should be analyzed in greater
depth than has been done in our brief presentation of the European water basin and airspace
management schemes. Such case studies should go beyond the empirical analysis of
natural resource regulation to include other (super) wicked problems that diverge in terms
of their respective audience, severity, visibility, complexity, urgency, scale, etc. Future
studies should include as potential FRS candidates (in an ideal–typical epistemological
approach) the public regulation of economic issues. Examples are the creation of the
‘‘Eurozone’’ to regulate monetary, financial and macroeconomic issues, core State func-
tions such as the ‘‘Schengen Area’’ implemented for border control, security and immi-
gration policies or, at a different scale (new) institutions in the domain of urban and
regional development (e.g., (new) metropolitan governance institutions or regional natural
parks, etc.). Additionally, new empirical case studies should also go beyond the European
context and analyze similar cases in the North American or Asian context. As a matter of
fact, no constitutive element of the FRS concept is dependent on the particularities of the
European institutional system. Last but not least, another complementary research strategy
might consist in analyzing, on a secondary basis and with a renewed FRS perspective, the
empirical examples already provided by previous approaches such as terrorism and
homeland security in the United States (as proposed by Jochim and May 2010) or global
climate change (Levin et al. 2012).
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